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The San Bernardino National Forest in southern California experienced an unprecedented bark beetle outbreak in the early 2000s.
The outbreak, coupled with a looming threat of catastrophic wildfire, droughts, changing forest management priorities, and a legacy
of poor forest management practices coalesced to create a challenge that existing institutions and management agencies could
not address. In response, an interagency collaborative effort, the Mountain Area Taskforce (MAST), was initiated. Based on key
informant interviews, this paper details how this new governance organization emerged and how it effectively addressed a landscape
scale forest challenge. Forest governance analyses often focus attention on macroscales, overlooking the microlevel arrangements
that set MAST apart from other responses to bark beetle outbreaks. Interagency collaboration has taken on greater importance in
efforts to address forest management at landscape scales and this case study provides important insights into the challenges and
opportunities of these new governance arrangements.
1. Introduction
In 2001, Southern California’s forests experienced the largest
bark beetle outbreak on record. The magnitude of the
outbreak, which peaked between 2003 and 2004, led to
unprecedented forest dieback, which dramatically altered the
forest landscape and contributed to extensive socioeconomic
consequences. Subsequent to the outbreak, devastating fires
occurred across southern California in 2003. In the San
Bernardino National Forest (SBNF) the “Old” and “Grand
Prix” fires merged, burned 5,863 hectares of forest, destroyed
thousands of homes, and cost more than $2 billion in
firefighting and property damage [1, 2]. Another fire, in 2007,
in the San Bernardino Mountains burned hundreds of more
homes. The “Station Fire” in the Angeles National Forest just
outside of Los Angeles in the fall of 2009 once again brought
national attention to forest management issues in the region.
In this paper, we examine a systems-based collabora-
tive effort, the Mountain Areas Safety Taskforce (MAST),
that mobilized to address a forest health crisis in south-
ern California’s forests. We present two arguments about
natural resource collaborative decision making. First, based
on a three-level approach (Table 1), we argue that problems
visible at a macrolevel (forest health crisis) require not
only an examination of mesolevel governance arrangements
but also the microfeatures of interagency collaborations
such as MAST and the on-the-ground implementation of
its programs. In this case, these microlevel arrangements
contributed to an effective response to the crisis. We aim to
illustrate how this effective response developed and how this
example contributes towards a better understanding of how
successful interagency collaboration can emerge. Bark beetle
outbreaks posed significant challenges to land managers and
policy makers across western North America. In southern
California an integrated, collaborative response materialized
that later served as a model for other areas facing similar
challenges.Thismicrolevel interagency collaboration sets this
case apart from others, providing an opportunity to assess
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Table 1: A three-level approach to policy logic.
System level Political actors Policy-relevant aspects Policy focus
Micro: human
agency/behavioral Individuals representing agencies Behavior/choice
MAST, collaborative dynamics/measures
of program success
Meso: governance
considerations Government—civil society
Governance: state—societal
relations
Institutional arrangements, policy
network, instrument choice
Macro: systemic Environment(landscape level problems)
Resources/constraints/
feedback Problem definition
the relative importance of specific factors and arrangements
in forest governance.
Second, focusing on the mesolevel, we argue that MAST
represents a “new governance” arrangement. Recently, Tollef-
son et al. [3] and Howlett et al. [4] developed three-
dimensional frameworks in order to determine if there had
been shifts from government to new governance arrange-
ments inUS andCanadian natural resource sectors. Tollefson
et al.’s [3] framework is employed here to examine the three
dimensions of new governance (institutional, political, and
regulatory) in the case of MAST. Contrary to the other case
study applications in the natural resource sector, we argue
that MAST represents a new governance arrangement. We
apply indicators of new governance related to institutional,
political, and regulatory dimensions to illustrate how MAST
represents a new governance arrangement defined by an
interagency collaborative response to an unprecedented for-
est crisis.
2. New Forest Governance Arrangements and
the Necessity of Interagency Collaboration
Moving away from a mode of coordination based on hierar-
chical top-down, command, and control management, gov-
ernments have increasingly experimented with newmodes of
governance that rely on the incentives provided by markets
or the sharing of information in governance networks. Due
to complexities embedded in resource and environmental
issues, environmental policy has been a key venue for gov-
ernance changes. Recent advances in the natural resource
governance literature have sought to capture these gover-
nance dynamics and their effects on policy making [4]. A
large literature on contemporary governance arrangements
suggests that nonstate actors have gained an increasingly
important role in policy making as the complexity of policy
problems has increased, a process of institutional change
which governments have both reacted to and facilitated [5,
6]. Lacking the knowledge or the mandate to govern alone,
governments have increasingly chosen to try to construct
policy consensus through more engaged and interactive
forms of policy making and to allow nonstate actors to
implement those policies within a broad framework of
incentives, benchmarking, and private governance [7].This is
true in many areas where efforts have been made to develop
“integrated strategies” such as forestry and coastal marine
ecosystem management [8] and similar efforts are typical in
both climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts [9]. In
these new governance modes, the lines between public and
private have become blurred [10].
New governance arrangements call for increased atten-
tion towards themicrolevel and novel collaborative efforts. In
themicrolevel, leadership, communication, and collaborative
dynamics emerge. Collaborative management, engaging gov-
ernment agencies and departments with the general public,
has been touted as a viable approach for addressing complex
forest and natural resource management challenges [11, 12].
In comparison, interagency collaborative efforts, involving
multiple government agencies addressing natural resource
management, have received far less attention. Most work
on interagency collaboration has detailed how emerging
partnerships have typically failed. Vangen and Huxham [13]
found that “reports of unmitigated success are not common.”
Huxham [14] argues that “unless the potential for real
collaborative advantage is clear, it is generally best if there is
any choice to avoid collaboration.” However, decisionmakers
are increasingly recognizing that many natural resource
issues cannot be adequately addressed in the absence of
effective interagency collaboration. Additionally, dynamics
of collaborative efforts and their relative success need to be
understood in a larger governance context.
Understanding the role that mesolevel variables play in
the governance of complex forest problems involves three
specific dimensions: institutional, political, and regulatory.
The first dimension is linked to the structure and pervasive-
ness of policy networks which address the balance of power
between state actors and the societal actors and networks,
which in turn are linked to the kinds of policy instruments
that are chosen to give effect to new governance arrangements
[15]. In this network dimension, the number and diversity of
actors (state and nonstate) that exert some degree of power or
influence over the outputs of the governance arrangements
is a key facet of policy making [16]. In this respect, the
concern of the analyst is to identify where political power
lies in relation to society and the state [17, 18]. The challenge
is to determine whether, and to what extent, in specific
sectors and issue areas the state or its agents are directly
dictating the outcomes that emerge from the governance
arrangement, more loosely “steering” the arrangement, or
alternatively whether ultimate power to determine outcomes
rests with nonstate actors (e.g., corporations, unions, and
environmental civil society organizations) [19].
The second dimension has to do with the rigidity of insti-
tutional policy-related arrangements, namely, their formal
or informal nature. The institutional aspects of governance
arrangement can be assessed in terms of factors such as
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precision (how closely it constrains private action); obligation
(the “bindingness” of its commands); and delegation (the
extent to which the power to adjudicate and enforce these
obligations is retained by a regulator or delegated to an inde-
pendent third party) [3]. Recently, Doelle et al. [20] explored
these two dimensions in a study of climate-change-based
forest governance arrangements in Canada, New Zealand,
and USA.
Finally, the third dimension, the policy process, illus-
trates the dynamic features of governance arrangements by
focusing on policy making and policy change. The policy
cycle [4] and policy change frameworks (e.g., advocacy coali-
tion framework, institutional rational choice, and structural
choice) [21–24] are familiar approaches that draw upon the
network and institutional dimensions and provide an even
finer, more empirical lens to understand the complexity
and challenges of governance. Stedman [25] utilized these
approaches in their examination of climate change adaptation
policy formulation in the Canadian agriculture, forestry, and
water sectors.
In this paper, we also evaluate what interagency collabo-
ration entails and what factors make it successful. Bardach
[26] argues that collaboration encompasses “activities by
agencies intended to increase public value by having the
agencies working together rather than separately.” Similarly,
Thomas [27] argues that collaboration is “an unmandated
effort by public officials in at least two local, state, or federal
agencies to coordinate their activities or share resources.”
This latter definition highlights the important point that
interagency collaboration often arises not from an official
mandate but through a shared recognition of a need by
the parties involved. Whether parties collaborate, however,
depends on many factors, including the extent to which
they depend on one another [27]. Empirical studies sug-
gest successful interagency collaborative efforts that include
allowing participants to have flexibility, motivating lower
level staff, providing accountability, ensuring quality, ade-
quately addressing financial matters, identifying common
aims, and maintaining purpose over time [14, 26, 28, 29].The
interagency collaboration literature highlights three key indi-
cators critical to interagency collaborative success: effective
leadership, trust, and minimizing turf disputes (i.e., [13, 30–
32]). These three indicators represent key components of
interagency collaboration.
Applying a three-level approach, we now focus onMAST
and its response to an unprecedented forest crisis. The
bark beetle outbreak and subsequent fires in the SBNF
occurred at a macrolevel. Addressing this problem initiated
efforts at the mesolevel (new governance arrangements in
the institutional, political, and regulatory dimensions) and
microlevel (interagency collaboration) to address it. Rather
than focusing on the macrolevel and a top-down approach,
this case affords the opportunity to look at how bottom-up
interagency collaboration and new governance arrangements
coalesced to address this challenge. In addition, this paper
focuses attention on the interagency collaborative effort that
emerged and the extent to which it addressed the three key
indicators (leadership, trust, and minimizing turf disputes)
necessary for effective collaboration put forth in the literature.
3. Methods
This project began by visiting forest systems experiencing
unprecedented bark beetle outbreaks and forest health crises.
Site visits occurred in NewMexico, Colorado,Wyoming, and
British Columbia, and also included interviews with forest
managers in Montana, Idaho, Washington, and Oregon. We
selected the SBNF because it was experiencing an unprece-
dented forest dieback, had initiated significant management
responses, had changed public policy, had received significant
state and federal resources to address the situation, and
also created a unique, interagency collaborative response
to orchestrate and facilitate actions. These features set it
apart from responses initiated elsewhere. After selecting this
case, we implemented a mixed method approach for data
collection and analysis. This included conducting 80 in-
person key informant interviews with individuals associated
with MAST over a two-year period. Interviews primarily
focused attention on individuals directly involved in MAST
(US Forest Service, CalFire, San Bernardino County repre-
sentatives, California State agencies, the Natural Resource
Conservation Service, local fire departments, and private
companies) but also included elected officials, academics, and
concerned citizens engaged in responding to the forest health
crisis.
We developed and employed a semistructure interview
guide that focused its attention on the causes and responses
to the bark beetle outbreak, specifically howMAST organized
and operated. The semistructure interview guide allowed for
each interview to engage the unique perspective and expertise
of each respondent. Interviews were recorded, transcribed,
and analyzed using a coding system. In addition to interviews,
observations were made at regional meetings related to
MAST activities, as well as community group meetings that
dealt with new regulations and fire protection plans. Finally,
primary documents from government agencies and financial
records related to MAST were collected and analyzed.
4. Background: The San Bernardino
National Forest
The SBNF encompasses over 273,837 hectares of public
land and three ranger districts [33] in southern California
(Figure 1). The national forest resides within San Bernardino
and Riverside Counties and lies just outside of the city limits
of the city of San Bernardino. Chaparral, oak, pin˜on/juniper,
and scrub ecosystems dominate the national forest but
also include forests that harbor Coulter (Pinus coulteri),
Ponderosa (Pinus ponderosa), Lodgepole (Pinus contorta),
sugar (Pinus lambertiana), and Jeffrey (Pinus jeffreyi) pines,
incense cedar (Calocedrus decurrens), canyon oak (Quercus
chrysolepis), and Douglas fir (Pseudotsuga menziesii). Unlike
most national forests that have contiguous public lands, the
SBNF surrounds private property and towns with signifi-
cant population centers. This creates difficult challenges for
public land management, including the necessity to prior-
itize actions that protect private property. A USFS district
ranger noted: “the SBNF has more people living within its
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Figure 1: The San Bernardino National Forest.
boundaries than any other forest in the country.” Private
property in-holdings exceed 59,549 hectares on the forest
[33]. Its proximity also makes the SBNF one of the most
heavily visited national forests.
In recent decades visitors and residents demanded new
USFS management practices that favored aesthetic values
and recreation over timber production. Timber harvesting
disappeared from the region by the mid-1970s. Without
timber management, funds for providing aesthetic and recre-
ation values diminished. Over time, the USFS dramatically
changed its workforce: by the early 1990s the forest had
no foresters on staff. This made it difficult to conduct any
forestmanagement operations, such as thinning projects.The
latest forest plan explicitly states, “Lands with a timber man-
agement objective are not suitable on southern California
national forests. These national forests need to be actively
managed for a variety of other purposes, including wildlife
habitat and recreation opportunities” [34].
4.1. Macro Level: Unprecedented Forest Health Crisis in the
SBNF. The emergence of an unprecedented forest health
crisis in the SBNF can be traced to the simultaneous
interaction of three interrelated natural phenomena (bark
beetle, drought, and catastrophic fires) and a legacy of forest
management (Table 2). Depending on forest conditions, the
Western Pine beetle (Dendroctonus brevicomis) fluctuates
in population size. Across North America, bark beetles
have caused unprecedented forest disturbances [35]. These
outbreaks have occurred in forests dominated by conifer
species. Outbreaks interact with other forest disturbances
[36] and affect fire regimes [37]. They have recently affected
high elevation stands formerly buffered by cold temperatures
[38] and have had considerable economic as well as ecological
consequences [39, 40]. The SBNF bark beetle outbreak
rapidly expanded beginning in 2000, and by 2002 represented
a significant forest health crisis that policy makers and land
managers had to respond to. By early 2003 70,000 hectares of
the SBNF were affected ([41], cited in [1]).
Twomajor factors contributed to the unprecedented bee-
tle outbreak: drought and fire suppression in the SBNF. Forest
health acts as the primary control on beetle populations, as
individual tree vigor is the primary defense against beetle
outbreaks. Healthy trees have the ability to drive out beetles
with resin [42], whereas drought and competition can reduce
vigor, leaving trees more susceptible to attack. In the late
1990s a severe drought occurred across southern California.
According to an ecologist working in the region, by the late
1990s, the SBNF forest landscape was in the “driest physical
state it had been in since the 18th century.”
Exacerbating the situation was a long history of fire
suppression by government agencies. Past forestmanagement
contributed to a higher proportion of mature pine trees on
the landscape and higher tree density levels [43]. Beetles pref-
erentially attack mature pine trees and higher density levels
increase tree competition for limited water and nutrients. We
now turn to themeso- andmicrolevels to explore howMAST
addressed this macrolevel crisis.
4.2. Mesolevel: The Mountain Area Safety Taskforce: A New
Governance Arrangement. The threat of catastrophic fire
and widespread tree mortality posed a significant risk to
communities.TheUSFS in conjunctionwith a variety of other
state and municipal agencies began discussions in November
2002 about addressing declining forest health. Preliminary
meetings focused on finding ways to more efficiently address
bark beetle and fire potential by cutting more trees and
making communities less vulnerable to catastrophic fire.
Collectively, there was a realization that no single agency
could deal with such a complex problem. MAST, a coalition
that included county, state, federal natural resource agencies,
electric power companies, forest management contractors,
and public safety agencies (Table 3), identified the following
broad goals:
to develop and implement an integrated and coordi-
nated approach to address the disaster’s immediate
impacts on life, safety, and social and economic
values, while implementing a long-range recovery
plan resulting in safe communities and ecological
sustainability.
Based on Tollefson et al.’s [3] three government to gover-
nance dimensions (institutional, political, and regulatory) we
discuss MAST’s organization and actions.
4.2.1. Formal but Voluntary: MAST’s Institutional Dimensions.
The nature of emergency management requires some degree
of organization and formality. MAST efforts revealed strong
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Table 2: Primary contributing factors leading to forest disturbances in the San Bernardino National Forest.
Contributing factor to
forest disturbance Context Consequence
Drought Driest physical state forests had been in over acentury.
Trees died from water stress; those that survived
had increased vulnerability to bark beetles.
Forest management
practices
Shift from forest cutting to forest protection;
managing for “park like” conditions;
homeowner laws and public perceptions that
limited or forbid direct forest management.
Tree densities increased, as did the age class of trees,
contributing to a landscape with more mature trees,
which bark beetles preferentially target, providing
sufficient host material for the outbreak to occur.
Fires
Strict fire prevention practices and policies
implemented; removal of natural fire regime
across the landscape.
Lack of fire contributed to dense forests with older
age classes. This created a continuous canopy that
contributed to uncontrollable crown fires.
Beetles
Endemic beetle populations had access to
increased host material due to drought and
more mature trees on the landscape.
Controls that typically hold populations at low
levels were lost. Populations exploded, killing trees
at unprecedented levels.
Table 3: MAST member organizations.
Federal
partners
US Forest Service
Natural Resources Conservation Service
State
partners
California Department of Forestry and Fire
Protection (CalFire)
California Department of Transportation
California Highway Patrol
County
partners
County of San Bernardino
San Bernardino County Fire Department
San Bernardino Office of Emergency
Services
San Bernardino County Department of Public
Works
San Bernardino County Sheriff
San Bernardino County Solid Waste Management
San Bernardino County Public Works/Hazardous
Tree Removal
Local fire
departments
Arrowbear Lake Fire Department
Big Bear City Fire Department
Big Bear Lake Fire Protection District
Crest Forest Fire Protection District
Running Springs Fire Department
Fire safe
councils
Inland Empire Fire Safe Alliance
Angelus Oaks Fire Safe Council
Arrowhead Communities Fire Safe Council
Big Bear Valley Fire Safe Council
Lytle Creek Fire Safe Council
Mill Creek Canyon Fire Safe Council
Mountain Rim Fire Safe Council
Wrightwood Fire Safe Council
Public
utilities
Southern California Edison
Bear Valley Electric Company
institutional dimensions. Table 4 lists important institutional
indicators of new governance and how these indicators can
be identified in terms of the MAST organization. These indi-
cators relate to inclusive planning, an informal mandate and
an inclusive consultation process. Initially, MAST adopted a
degree of formality in its institutional arrangements. After the
initial meetings, MAST created a voluntary-based structure
that included a core group, a unified command group,
a media relations group, a liaison group to the broader
community, and four sections that formed the base of
the day-to-day organization: operations, planning, logistics,
and financial management. According to participants, this
organizational approach addressed critical barriers to imple-
menting actions, setting priorities, and generally shaping the
organizational structure and direction.
Compared to other collaborative efforts, MAST adopted
a more informal horizontal organization arrangement. This
was critical for utilizing resources.Therewas no formal agree-
ment binding participating agencies to the effort and exter-
nal funding that came from state and federal government
agencies, including $70million through theNatural Resource
Conservation Service. Despite government-wide budgetary
cuts and diminished external funding, a decade later, MAST
continues to operate in this manner. Interview respondents
stated that MAST exceeded their initial expectations and
critical land management actions were carried out in light of
the catastrophic natural events. One person reflected a sense
of optimism about the process: “It was amazing what we were
able to do here. Absolutely amazing.” Another said “I spent 40
years with the Forest Service, I have never seen a program run
so effectively. It is probably, as far as I am concerned, the best
example of how all levels of government can work together.”
4.2.2. Shared Informal Decision Making: MAST’s Political
Dimensions. Interagency collaboration, as described above,
has been proven to be difficult to achieve. Agencies defend-
ing turf or prioritizing their own as opposed to collective
goals can derail interagency collaboration. MAST averted
this problem in part due to their informal decision mak-
ing process; Table 5 identifies the political indicators of
new governance and highlights how they relate to MAST.
Rather than create a top-down decision-making process that
directed activities, MAST created an informal partnership.
No organization had to formally join MAST and decision
making, based on a gap analysis (see below), leveraged agency
actions by allowing each agency to contribute in a way
that protected their own interests but also contributed to
the overall goals MAST established. Open meetings where
partner organizations could contribute to discussions about
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Table 4: MAST’s institutional dimension.
Institutional indicators MAST
Quantity and diversity of actors engaged in
the institutionalized process in question
The most inclusive forest planning process in the region, MAST involved a
comprehensive set of public and private interests in the decision-making
process.
Origin and nature of mandate Informal mandate agreed upon by diverse actors in response to loomingforest catastrophe.
Nature and extent of consultation with
affected interests
Created inclusive polycentric working group tasked with implementing
shared goals and objectives.
Table 5: MAST’s political dimension.
Political indicators MAST
Quantity and diversity of actors with some degree
of power or influence over decision/output
Rather than a top-down, hierarchy, MAST enabled all interested
parties to contribute to decision making in collaborative fashion.
Actual formal decision-making power/actual not
formal ability to influence decisions and outcomes
MAST partners collectively informally influenced decisions that
led to interagency actions by participating groups and entities.
objectives and actions facilitated communication and shared
decision making. MAST decisions enabled each partner
organization to contribute based on their missions and
abilities, while still making important contributions to estab-
lished MAST priorities. MAST established a framework that
enabled dialogue between partner organizations that had not
occurred previously in the region. Interview respondents that
participated inMAST suggested that the communication and
joint decision making were the primary factors that enabled
MAST to effectively organize a response to the forest health
crisis.
4.2.3. Setting Priorities: MAST’s Regulatory Dimension.
Table 6 illustrates how MAST demonstrates regulatory
indicators of new governance. MAST followed the “soft law”
process. In a soft law process there is no formal entity with
jurisdiction to institute or demand hard law outcomes and
partners that contribute to decisions. MAST participants had
no formal commitment, participating as equal partners with
shared goals. It was organized in a way that gave voice to all
participants. Rather than agencies and stakeholders working
to meet their own objectives, MAST created a platform
to allow an integrated response that focused on the forest
system, not political boundaries. Actions taken thus dealt
with pressing problems on federal, state, county, and private
lands. MAST helped orchestrate policy changes at the state
and county levels, as well as policies regulating vegetation
management on private lands that facilitated their agreed
upon objectives. Through this process, MAST garnered
legitimacy both in a regulatory sense and also in terms of
public perception.That legitimacy then enabled MAST to set
priorities and implement actions.
MAST established three priorities early on that helped
direct their efforts to effectively address the beetle out-
break and forest health crisis. First, they sought to pro-
tect communication sites such as radio towers and radio
repeaters vital for ensuring effective communication during
an emergency across the SBNF. In particular, these would
help communication efforts in the case of evacuating all
residents living in or near the SBNF. MAST identified those
sites that needed protection and designed fuel treatments
in the surrounding forest areas to divert fire away from
them. Protecting evacuation corridors and putting in place
an evacuation plan was MAST’s second major activity. Only
a few roads access the manymountain communities, housing
developments, and individual houses in the SBNF. Trees
falling over roads or fires hinder emergency evacuation
and could also inhibit emergency services and firefighters
from accessing communities in need. MAST identified key
corridors needing tree thinning to ensure that blockages
would not occur. Finally MAST set out a broad strategy of
community protection. MAST identified those areas most
in danger from fires and worked across agencies to put in
place plans to remove dead trees near homes and undertake
long-term fuel reduction projects on community edges in an
attempt to lower the likelihood of fire and to divert fires away
from communities. Such projects created breaks in forest
canopies and fuel breaks to divert fires around communities
and attempted to foster long-term efforts to ensure that forest
regrowth would not recreate similar conditions conducive to
another bark beetle outbreak.
The actionsMAST took required a new regulatory frame-
work. Previous to the bark beetle outbreak, agencies and
institutions with jurisdiction over land management in and
around the SBNF did not, and in many cases could not,
effectively work in an integrated fashion. MAST created a
voluntary organization that, coupled with policy changes,
established an interagency collaborative framework to col-
lectively take action. This hybrid system, including agencies
and stakeholders working to meet their own objectives while
simultaneously working tomeet the broader goals established
by MAST, enabled effective forest management to occur.
MAST successfully implemented management actions that
many respondents indicated had not occurred for decades
and were long overdue.
4.3. Microlevel: Interagency Collaboration: The Nuts and
Bolts of New Governance Arrangements. MAST faced
ISRN Economics 7
Table 6: MAST’s regulatory dimension.
Regulatory indicators MAST
Quantity and diversity of actors engaged in
the regulatory arrangement
Formal and informal partners contributed to regulatory arrangement.
Decisions followed a soft law process in which partners contributed to
decisions (i.e., no formal entity had jurisdiction to institute or demand hard
law outcomes).
Precision (how closely does the output
prescribe and constrain private action?)
Precision: the decisions made had direct implications for federal, state, and
county agencies, as well as private landowners (i.e., the decisions affected land
of all types of land jurisdictions).
Obligation (how legally binding is the
obligation?)
Obligation: policy changes at the state level as well as changes to county and
property laws facilitated legally binding actions regarding forest and property
management that did not exist prior to the outbreak.
Delegation (is the duty of adjudicating and
enforcing the obligation vested in an
independent third party or retained by the
regulator?)
Delegation: Policy changes provided delegation of enforcement to MAST
partners, supported by the public legal system.
multiple on-the-ground obstacles not readily observed in the
mesolevel new governance literature. Successful interagency
collaboration requires a continual contribution of its
voluntary participants who support the efforts’ objectives
while balancing their own agency’s goals. This proves
particularly important when confronting unprecedented,
landscape level problems where effectiveness requires
innovation and flexibility, working effectively across both
internal and external agency boundaries, moving away from
short-term goals, and recognizing the need to maintain a
long-term focus.
Within this unique new governance arrangement, there
were a number of specific on-the-ground features that helped
MAST successfully meet stated goals and objectives. These
features cannot be captured in the mesolevel literature. Eval-
uating whether a program or effort is successful when faced
with everyday problems can prove challenging. Challenges
on the scale on the SBNF posed even greater obstacles.
However, interview participants highlighted two primary
indicators for program success: meeting short-term goals and
facilitating long-term fuel modification work. The 2003 fires
burned 60,700 hectares and destroyed over 1,000 structures
[44]. The thinning work and tree removal efforts spared
all the communication sites in the SBNF, thus allowing
for communication to continue unimpeded. Uninterrupted
communication was important for meeting the second short-
term goal, implementing a resident evacuation strategy.
Interview respondents deemed evacuation efforts a suc-
cess because law enforcement partners held public meetings,
distributed materials, and used public service announce-
ments to educate the public about the evacuation strategy.
After the fires started, MAST partners initiated the evac-
uation plan. The County Sheriff Department brought in
deputies along with search and rescue volunteers to provide
residents with evacuation instructions and procedures. They
used loudspeakers in neighborhoods to inform residents,
implemented an emergency telephone system, and used
helicopters to assess the situation and identify residents in
need.On the roadways, established plans directed residents to
evacuation routes and the county and state law enforcement
agencies worked together tomaintain order over the two days
inwhich over 45,000 peoplewere successfully evacuated [44].
The third and longer-rangeMASTobjectivewas to reduce
community vulnerability to fire through fuel modification
work. Several fires, including the Grass Valley Fire in
2007 burned 199 homes. However, fuel modification efforts
prevented more damage. In particular, an analysis of fire
behavior showed that fuelmodification efforts have decreased
the intensity of fires and in several cases diverted fires around
homes and communities [45]. A county fire marshal noted
that “a $60,000 fuel break saved over 500 homes.”
Promoting community fire safety occurred at three differ-
ent levels. First, individual homeowners could apply for the
federal Forest Care Program that funded the removal vege-
tation around homes. Homeowners who do not meet county
ordinance requirements were still eligible for 75% reimburse-
ment for fuel reduction work coordinated through Forest
Care. According to a coordinator of the Forest Care program,
1275 homeowners utilized the program, treating over 265
hectares. Second, at the county level, the San Bernardino
Hazard Tree Program undertook fuel modification work.
The program treated over 15,059 hectares and removed over
300,000 trees in and around SBNF communities. And finally,
the USFS also undertook fuel modification work through-
out SBNF. According to a USFS regional forest manager,
between 2003 and 2010 fuels reductionwork on nearly 30,000
hectares was undertaken, representing approximately 11% of
the SBNF’s land base.
4.3.1. Factors Contributing to Interagency Success. The litera-
ture on interagency collaboration highlights the importance
of leadership in promoting successful outcomes [13, 14, 26,
28–30, 46]. The SBNF forest supervisor provided strong
leadership in initiating MAST’s formation. As a result, other
agencies contributed resources and personnel to the effort.
The group of agency heads that directed the high level policy
discussions for MAST established priority actions and goals
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that subgroups utilized to identify on the ground activities
necessary to meet the broader MAST goals.
In addition to individual and organizational leadership
within MAST, its partner organizations and individuals
within those agencies illustrated key leadership regarding
public relations. The MAST organization established threats
and priorities that all participants agreed upon. This shared
perspective created cohesiveness among those involved and
more importantly a shared understanding of both the prob-
lems they collectively faced and the solutions to them. This
unanimity allowed each person involved in MAST to serve
as a spokesperson to clearly convey the approach MAST
had undertaken to address the threats facing communities
and homeowners across the mountain. MASTmembers held
public meetings across mountain communities and talked
about the role their particular agency played in the effort
but also had the ability to speak competently about the
broader MAST effort. This enabled MAST representatives to
effectively communicate with the public to generate support
for forest management actions that prior to the outbreak
would not have found support.This played an important role
in moving MAST objectives forward.
The interagency collaboration literature often raises
the importance of participants having common aims. The
impending and ongoing natural disasters in the SBNF con-
tributed to a coherent aim across MAST organizations. Many
individuals found thatMAST shaped participant perceptions.
As a respondent fromCalFire put it “the experience ofMAST
caused the participants to view their own particular problem
in relationship to how it impacted all the other agencies” and
“that is probably the most unique factor out of MAST, the
shaping of perceptions.”
Turf issues and trust represent the other two primary
issues affecting interagency collaborative efforts. In this case,
the shared perception of an imminent threat to life and
property brought entities with jurisdiction on the mountain
together to address a common problem and facilitated trust
and a shared understanding across MAST members. The
creation of MAST helped galvanize trust and a common
purpose across partner organizations. This led to partner
organizations and individualswithin themcontributingwith-
out worrying about turf battles or seeking credit or attention.
Undertaking an institutional gap analysis represents
one of MASTs most innovative and important elements.
Respondents suggested that the gap analysis emerged during
their efforts to identify how many partner organizations
had jurisdiction across the mountain and to identify their
mandates. From that baseline they then identified specific
actions each entity could take and from that collective
assessment identified what actions remained unaddressed.
This process served to streamline action and reduce turf
battles.MAST set out in early 2003 to undertake a gap analysis
of all the entities with jurisdiction over land management
or communities. The gap analysis identified the partner
organizations, their responsibilities, and assessed whether
they could meet their responsibilities given the forest health
crisis. It also provided a means to identifying how partners
could combine their efforts to expedite tree removal and fuel
management projects. Without a gap analysis each partner
would have continued to engage in efforts isolated from those
taken by others. The gap analysis allowed both streamlining
work and leveraging the actions of each partner to more
strategically address broader MAST goals.
5. Conclusion
The bark beetle outbreak that erupted in the SBNF not
only posed a significant threat to community safety but
also rendered existing governance impotent to address
an unprecedented landscape level problem. Occurring at
a macrolevel, this forest health emergency necessitated a
mesolevel response that included specific actions at the
microlevel. The MAST emerged to meet the challenges
posed. Dense housing in overstocked forests susceptible to
catastrophic fire created a dangerous situation that compelled
agencies to respond.The recognition that individual agencies
could not alone address the issue necessitated a collaborative
response. MAST formed expressly to maximize collective
resources and work across agencies to initiate projects that
reduce the threat fire posed to communities.
The literature on new governance highlights elements
that differentiate MAST from traditional or “old” governance
approaches. These include governance arrangements that
blur the lines between private and public interests. As illus-
trated by institutional, political, and regulatory indicators, we
argue that MAST represents an example of new governance.
MAST strategically incorporated private actors in its decision
making and more importantly in its on-the-ground actions.
This included energy companies that had jurisdiction over
power lines on the mountain, private contractors to under-
take forest thinning projects, and individual property owners
engaged in vegetation thinning across private property. More
importantly, MAST embodied a new governance approach
by introducing a flexible policy approach that engaged a
large diversity of actors. MAST had a strategic, hierarchical
planning process that enabled all actors to participate and
inform decision making. No one agency had supremacy over
others and each agency committed to following the process
and decision made collectively by MAST.This organizational
structure served to engage all actors, provide them a reason to
participate, and has created a lasting governing structure that
met short-term objectives and persists to address decades-
long objectives related to maintaining forest health across the
landscape.
MAST created an effective interagency collaborative
effort. Particular elements contributed to this outcome. The
literature on interagency collaboration singles out leadership,
trust, and minimizing turf disputes as critical to effective
interagency collaboration. MAST created a new governance
structure that addressed these three elements. A gap analysis
identified who could contribute and where vulnerabilities
existed across agencies. In addition to those elements, other
factors fell into place that enabled work to move forward.
MAST helped coordinate an effort that led to effective
measures to reduce the risk of fire to communities, protect
communication towers, and the successful evacuation of
residents threatened by fire. In some cases, analyses of
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fire behavior have shown that fuel modification work has
successfully diverted fires away from communities.
Through the creation of a new governance arrangement
to address forest health problems in Southern California,
MAST has established a model that others can manipulate to
address macrolevel problems through meso- and microlevel
responses. Interagency collaboration will undoubtedly play a
prominent role in addressing landscape level forest problems
in the future elsewhere and MAST provides insights on how
to create such an approach.
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